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1981] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
deed, the lack of post-Harris authority precluding the use of ille-
gally obtained evidence on the basis of trustworthiness indicates
that its significance is rather limited. Though the trustworthiness
proviso may be available as a bridge between the impeachment
process and the constitutional mandate to protect the accused, its
parameters remain undefined after Washington. Thus, the Court
of Appeals perpetuates rather than clarifies the uncertainty engen-
dered by Harris regarding legal standards of trustworthiness.
Caroline Landau Spilberg
Publisher may be held liable for republication of libel when
grossly irresponsible acts were committed in course of original
publication
The liability of a corporate media employer who publishes a
libel215 against a private person is founded upon imputation to the
employer2 16 of its employees' grossly irresponsible conduct.21 7 It
at trial in which the defendant's constitutional right to counsel had been violated could not
be used to impeach his credibility as a witness when he testified on his own behalf in a
separate and unrelated criminal trial. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972). Although the
"trustworthiness" of such a conviction would appear to be in issue, the Loper Court did not
address that issue in reaching its result. This omission in Loper, as well as the vagueness in
Harris and Washington, suggest that perhaps the term "trustworthiness" has not yet been
clearly defined because the courts are trying to protect the rights of defendants while at-
tempting to insure that the most reliable evidence is introduced. See generally Nokes, AN
INTRODUCTION TO EvMENcE 294 (3d ed. 1962). Indeed, it appears that the degree of police
misconduct, rather than the trustworthiness of the statements, is the crucial factor in the
determination of admissibility. Id.
" Libel has been defined as a defamatory writing containing "words which tend to
expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aver-
sion, ostracism, degradation or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of one in the minds of
right-thinking persons, and to deprive one of their confidence and friendly intercourse in
society." Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186 N.E. 217, 218
(1933). Complete defenses to an accusation of libel include truth, Dolcin Corp. v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 7 App. Div. 2d 449, 454, 183 N.Y.S.2d 342, 347 (1st Dep't 1959), and privilege.
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 114 at 776 (4th ed. 1971). Retraction
and introduction of evidence tending to establish the plaintiff's preexisting bad reputation,
although not complete defenses, can serve to mitigate damages. Id. at 799-801. For a brief
discussion of the history of libel law see Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 151-53
(1967).
21' The individual author, the corporate publisher, and other persons involved in thepublication of libel may be held jointly accountable. See Macy v. New York World-Tele-
gram Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 416, 141 N.E.2d 566, 161 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1957); Corrigan v. Bobbs-Mer-
rill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920); Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 73 App. Div. 2d
43, 425 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1st Dep't 1980). The liability of a corporate publisher for the acts of
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had been unclear, however, whether suspension of the employees'
liability for such conduct also shielded the employer-publisher. 218
Recently, in Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc.,21 e the Court of Appeals
held that a corporate publisher may be liable for republication of
those in its employ has been premised on several theories. E.g., Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill
Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920) (agency principles of notice and knowledge); cf. Can-
trell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253 & n.6 (1974) (respondeat superior).
'17 Traditionally, New York followed a rule of strict liability in libel. See Corrigan v.
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 63-64, 126 N.E. 260, 262 (1920); Triggs v. Sun Printing and
Publishing Ass'n, 179 N.Y. 144, 155, 71 N.E. 739, 742-43 (1904); Dall v. Time, Inc., 252 App.
Div. 636, 639, 300 N.Y.S. 680, 683 (1937), aff'd, 278 N.Y. 635, 16 N.E.2d 297 (1938). In New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court supplanted the strict
liability in libel standard, as it applied to public officials, with one requiring proof of "actual
malice." Id. at 283. The actual malice standard was subsequently applied to libel of a public
figure. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Finally, the Supreme Court abol-
ished strict liability in libel actions by private persons against media defendants. Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz, the Supreme Court directed the states to
develop a fault standard to measure the liability of defendants who had allegedly libeled
private persons. Id. at 347. Accordingly, New York adopted a "gross irresponsibility" stan-
dard to govern in this situation. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196,
341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975). The Chapadeau Court held that, in light of Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the liability of a media defendant for libel of
private persons involved in matters of public interest required proof "by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the publisher acted in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consid-
eration for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by
responsible parties." Id. at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64. In applying the
Chapadeau standard, New York courts have held that matters of public interest within the
rule include the health and safety of elderly people, Cottom v. Meredith Corp., 65 App. Div.
2d 165, 411 N.Y.S.2d 53 (4th Dep't 1978), leave to appeal denied, 46 N.Y.2d 711, 389
N.E.2d 841, 416 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1979), judicial proceedings involving real estate, Wehringer
v. Newman, 60 App. Div. 2d 385, 400 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1st Dep't), leave to appeal denied, 44
N.Y.2d 641, 376 N.E.2d 205, 404 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1978), and allegedly deceptive practices by
vocational schools, Commercial Programming Unlimited v. CBS Inc., 50 App. Div. 2d 351,
378 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1st Dep't 1975). "Gross irresponsibility" has been found when the defen-
dants had broadcasted a television interview which included unsubstantiated accusations of
the plaintiff's medical malpractice. Greenberg v. CBS Inc., 69 App. Div. 2d 693, 419
N.Y.S.2d 988 (2d Dep't 1979). Another court found "gross irresponsibility" when the defen-
dant had aired a television report which, without substantiation, accused the plaintiff of
charging usurious interest rates, incorrectly reported that the plaintiff school was not ap-
proved by the New York State Department of Education, incorrectly reported that the Fed-
eral Trade Commission had brought suit against the plaintiff, and presented a distorted
interview with the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs. Commercial Programming Unlimited
v. CBS Inc., 50 App. Div. 2d 351, 378 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1st Dep't 1975).
21' See Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397
N.Y.S.2d 943, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 73 App.
Div. 2d 43, 425 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1st Dep't 1980). In both Holt, Rinehart and Viking Penguin,
the courts, although presented with the issue, declined to decide whether the employees'
immunity from liability also shielded the employer-publisher.
219 51 N.Y.2d 531, 416 N.E.2d 557, 435 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1980), aft'g in part, rev'g in part,
71 App. Div. 2d 411, 422 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1st Dep't 1979).
1981] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
its employees' defamatory articles, even though the employees
themselves escaped liability due to the running of the statute of
limitations.2 2
In Karaduman, one of the defendants, Newsday, had pub-
lished a series of reports which traced the path of the international
narcotics trade from Europe and Asia to the United States.221 A
year later, the New American Library (NAL), pursuant to an
agreement with Newsday and with the assistance of a Newsday ed-
itor, republished the series in pocketbook form.222 Subsequent to
the republication, the plaintiff, implicated in the series as a narcot-
ics smuggler, commenced a libel action against, inter alios, News-
day.223 The plaintiff's first cause of action alleged libel in the origi-
nal publication of the series.224 Because more than 1 year had
elapsed between the publication and the interposition of the claim,
it was dismissed as not timely.225 The causes of action based upon
republication of the series, however, were deemed timely.226 Claim-
ing that the plaintiff's evidence failed to raise a triable issue of fact
whether the defendants were grossly irresponsible, the defendants
moved for summary judgment.227 The Supreme Court, Special
22. Id. at 553-54, 416 N.E.2d at 568, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 567-68.
221 Id. at 536, 416 N.E.2d at 558, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 558. Newsday published "The Heroin
Trail" between February 1 and March 4, 1973. Id. The series was the result of a 13 month
investigation by three Newsday reporters. Id. at 536, 416 N.E.2d at 558-59, 435 N.Y.S.2d at
558. Although the Pulitzer prize-winning series implicated over 300 people as being involved
with international heroin smuggling, Karaduman appears to be the only defamation suit
arising from its publication. Id. at 536-37, 416 N.E.2d at 559, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
222 Id. at 537, 416 N.E.2d at 559, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 558. NAL and Newsday signed a
licensing agreement on March 11, 1973, and NAL republished the series in June 1974. Id.
The agreement provided that defendant Forst, the Newsday editor who had edited the origi-
nal series, would assist NAL in republishing the series.
223 Id. In addition to Newsday, other defendants named by the plaintiff were the three
Newsday reporters who had authored the original series, the Newsday editor who assisted in
the republication of the series, and NAL. Id.
224 Id.
225 See id. The period within which a plaintiff must commence a suit for libel is 1 year.
See CPLR 215(3) (1972).
226 51 N.Y.2d at 537, 416 N.E.2d at 559, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
227 Id. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants submitted
affidavits outlining the detailed procedures that the authors had followed to insure the sub-
stantive accuracy of their work. Id. at 537-38, 416 N.E.2d at 559, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 558. In
addition, the affidavits stated that the plaintiff's link to the Euro-Asian narcotics smuggling
trade had been established through interviews with individuals who were in a position to
know of the plaintiff's alleged smuggling activities. Id. at 538, 416 N.E.2d at 559, 435
N.Y.S.2d at 558. The defendant authors submitted independent affidavits which asserted
that, even if a triable question of fact was presented regarding their gross irresponsibility in
publishing the original series, no triable issue could arise with respect to it since they were
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Term, granted the motion, but the Appellate Division, First De-
partment, reversed.228
On appeal, the Court of Appeals unanimously reversed, grant-
ing summary judgment to all defendants except Newsday.229 With
respect to Newsday, a divided Court voted to affirm the order de-
nying summary judgment.3 ° Writing for the majority,231 Judge
Jones reasoned that although a corporate publisher is liable for the
gross irresponsibility of its reporters, such liability would indepen-
dently "carry forward" should the publisher participate in the re-
publication of the defamatory material.23 2 Indeed, Judge Jones
noted that since Newsday's "carry forward" liability was direct,
not vicarious, it existed irrespective of whether Newsday's report-
ers had been shielded from liability by the running of the statute
of limitations.3 3
not involved in the republication. Id. at 538, 416 N.E.2d at 559, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 558-59. In
opposition to the defendant's motion, the plaintiff submitted affidavits by the reporters'
alleged sources wherein they denied having communicated with the defendant authors and
having implicated the plaintiff in the international narcotics trade. Id. at 538, 416 N.E.2d at
560, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
228 Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 71 App. Div. 2d 411, 415, 422 N.Y.S.2d 426, 429 (lst
Dep't 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 51 N.Y.2d 531, 416 N.E.2d 557, 435 N.Y.S.2d 556
(1980).
229 51 N.Y.2d at 540-41, 416 N.E.2d at 561, 566, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 560, 565. All judges
concurred in parts I, II and IV of the opinion authored by Judge Gabrielli. In Part I, the
Court granted summary judgment to the three reporters because no triable question of fact
had been raised as to whether "the reporters 'published, participated in, authored [or] per-
mitted' the publication of the book." Id. at 540, 416 N.E.2d at 561, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 560. In
Part II, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims against defendant Forst, the Newsday
editor who assisted in the republication of the original series, holding that summary judg-
ment was proper because no triable issue of fact was raised as to whether he "personally"
performed his duties concerning the republication in a grossly irresponsible manner. Id. at
541, 416 N.E.2d at 561, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 560. In Part IV, the Court dismissed the cause of
action asserted against NAL, reasoning that no triable question of fact existed to show that
NAL had reason to question the accuracy of the series or the validity of the reporters' work.
Id. at 550, 416 N.E.2d at 556, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 565-66. The Court also reasoned that NAL
was entitled to rely on Newsday's adherence to adequate journalistic practices. Id. at 551,
416 N.E.2d at 567, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 566.
220 Id. at 552, 416 N.E.2d at 567, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
21 Judge Jones authored the opinion in which Judges Jasen, Fuchsberg and Meyer con-
curred. Chief Judge Cooke and Judge Wachtler concurred in a dissent authored by Judge
Gabrielli which appears as Part III of the main opinion.
232 51 N.Y.2d at 553, 416 N.E.2d at 568, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
33 Id. The majority reasoned that no case support existed for shielding a corporate
publisher from liability in defamation simply because "participating corporate personnel"
were free from liability concerning the particular publication. Id. at 554, 416 N.E.2d at 568,
435 N.Y.S.2d at 567-68. But see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 180 (1958) which
states that "[a] disclosed or partially disclosed principal is entitled to all defenses arising
out of a transaction between his agent and a third person." Id.
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Dissenting, Judge Gabrielli stated that Newsday could not be
vicariously liable for its reporters' gross irresponsibility in author-
ing the original series since the reporters' liability had been "ex-
tinguished. ' 23 4 Hence, the dissent reasoned, Newsday's alleged re-
publication liability necessitated a second incident of gross irre-
sponsibility.2 5 Moreover, the dissent posited that such a second
incident could not properly be premised upon imputation of the
alleged guilty knowledge of the reporters, since in libel cases the
unimpeded exercise of first amendment rights is of preeminent im-
portance.236 The dissent concluded by noting that only the acts
and knowledge of Newsday employees who had participated in the
republication effort could be imputed to Newsday to constitute a
second incident of gross irresponsibility. 237
It is submitted that the Karaduman decision subjects corpo-
rate publishers to an unjustifiably strict standard of liability for
the republication of defamatory material. By holding the corporate
republisher indefinitely liable23 8 for its primary publication culpa-
ble conduct239 and by carrying forward such culpable conduct as a
234 51 N.Y.2d at 546, 416 N.E.2d at 564, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 563 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
235 See id. (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). Judge Gabrielli conceded that Newsday might
have been liable for the original publication under a respondeat superior theory. Id.
(Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
238 Id. at 548-49, 416 N.E.2d at 565, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 565 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). Al-
though the dissent was "theoretically tempt[ed]" to impute the "guilty knowledge" of the
reporters to their employer for the purpose of determining its accountability in libel, it
deemed this approach improper. Id. at 546-47, 416 N.E.2d at 564, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 563-64
(Gabrielli, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that, when dealing with libel actions, the
imputation of knowledge should be used sparingly. Id. at 547, 416 N.E.2d at 564, 435
N.Y.S.2d at 564 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
23? Id. at 549-50, 416 N.E.2d at 566, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 565 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
Judge Gabrielli considered Newsday's participation in the republication to be a separate
business venture "conceptually unrelated" to Newsday's function as a newspaper publisher.
Id. at 547, 416 N.E.2d at 565, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 564 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). Accordingly,
the dissent interpreted Supreme Court dictates to require actual fault in the republication.
Id. at 547, 416 N.E.2d at 564, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 564 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
28 In contradiction to the maintenance of latent rights of action sanctioned by the
Karaduman majority, it is a general rule that statutes of limitations cannot be extended by
the courts. CPLR 201 (1972); see Caffaro v. Trayna, 35 N.Y.2d 245, 319 N.E.2d 174, 360
N.Y.S.2d 847 (1974). Nevertheless, statutory tolls and extensions operate to extend the time
within which an action may be commenced. E.g., CPLR 207 (1972); CPLR 208 (McKinney
Supp. 1980-1981); CPLR 209 (1972); CPLR 210 (1972).
2-39 51 N.Y.2d at 553, 416 N.E.2d at 568, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 567. Although republication
liability in Karaduman is dependent upon actions which were part of the original publica-
tion, the Court's holding is consistent with the "single publication rule" which provides that
when one impression or printing is used, there is a single publication, irrespective of how
many copies are distributed or how many people view the libel. See Gregoire v. G.P. Put-
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basis for republication liability,24 0 the Karaduman Court converts
the corporate publisher into a "no-fault" insurer of its employees'
acts.
241
Indeed, such a "no-fault" liability standard appears to contra-
vene the Supreme Court's holding that media liability for the defa-
mation of private persons requires a showing of fault.242 Another
consequence of "no-fault" republication liability is that the exer-
cise of first amendment rights might be chilled, because the pub-
lisher is faced either with reviving potential liability or refraining
from republishing.248 The publisher is further constrained since
even a thorough reinvestigation of its reporters' work may not ex-
culpate it from liability.2 4
nam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 126, 81 N.E.2d 45, 49 (1948). The rule has been applied, as it was
in Karaduman, to create one cause of action for the original distribution of a libelous writ-
ten work, regardless of how many copies are distributed, and to create a second cause of
action with a concomitant renewal of the statute of limitations upon a subsequent reissu-
ance or republication of the same libelous material. See Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298
N.Y. 119, 124, 81 N.E.2d 45, 47-48 (1948); Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 73 App. Div. 2d
43, 45, 425 N.Y.S.2d 101, 102 (lst Dep't 1980). In their application of the "single publication
rule," however, New York courts had not, prior to Karaduman, based republication liability
upon grossly irresponsible acts committed in the course of writing the original publication.
See Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 73 App. Div. 2d 43, 45, 425 N.Y.S.2d 101, 102 (1st Dep't
1980).
210 See 51 N.Y.2d at 553, 416 N.E.2d at 568, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 567. Each republication of
a libel is a tort distinct from earlier publications. Hartman v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 136
(3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948); Dodd v. Harper & Bros., 3 App. Div. 2d
548, 549, 162 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421 (1st Dep't 1957) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 4 N.Y.2d
958, 151 N.E.2d 622, 175 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1958); Municipal Training Center, Inc. v. National
Broadcasting Corp., 87 Misc. 2d 1044, 1045, 387 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1976). Thus, it appears illogical to predicate corporate liability for a republication of libelous
material upon grossly irresponsible conduct arising in the course of a prior publication.
Moreover, carrying forward and asserting the author's grossly irresponsible conduct against
the corporate republisher seems unjustified given that the author is not liable for republica-
tion. See Macy v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 416, 422, 141 N.E.2d 566, 570,
161 N.Y.S.2d 55, 60 (1957); Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 73 App. Div. 2d 43, 48, 425
N.Y.S.2d 101, 104 (1st Dep't 1980).
"41 Clearly, republication defamation liability after Karaduman still presupposes a find-
ing of gross irresponsibility, albeit that arising in the course of the original publication. See
51 N.Y.2d at 553-54, 416 N.E.2d at 568, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 567-68. Indeed, such prior culpable
conduct provides the fault upon which "no-fault" republication liability is based.
242 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964);
note 217 supra.
24 If a publisher has an obligation either to prove the truth of his statements or face
liability in libel he will certainly practice "self-censorship." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
24 See 51 N.Y.2d at 553-54, 416 N.E.2d at 568, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 567-68. Conceivably,
the managerial staff of Newsday could have performed a thorough reexamination of its re-
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It is suggested, therefore, that when a publisher adheres to ac-
cepted journalistic standards and rechecks the accuracy of a re-
porter's work prior to republication, it should be able to republish
without fear of suit.2 45 Unless publishers can escape republication
liability by a showing of reasonable pre-republication investigation,
the consequence may be that republication of even noncontrover-
sial material will be curtailed. Thus, it is recommended that in fu-
ture cases the Court should outline viable good faith defenses to
republication liability.
Howard D. Avrutine
porters' sources and assertions without discovering the reporters' gross irresponsibility. Id.
at 549, 416 N.E.2d at 566, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 565 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). Application of the
Karaduman Court's standard would, nonetheless, subject Newsday to liability in defama-
tion based upon the reporters' earlier gross irresponsibility.
245 See Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341 N.E.2d
569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975). The Chapadeau Court measured the defendant's con-
duct against accepted journalistic standards and did not distinguish between publications
and republications. Id. It is submitted, therefore, that the Chapadeau standard should ap-
ply to republication reinvestigations.
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